- 7 - that date, unfairly discriminated between two classes of similarly situated taxpayers. He asks us to imagine two taxpayers, A and B. A has a deficiency for the 1996 tax year, and B has one for the 1997 tax year. A and B are dealing with the same IRS agent, who while handling their cases is sent for a prolonged bout of training (clearly a managerial act) that causes unreasonable delays in the resolution of both cases. If the effective date of new section 6404(e) is constitutional, however, only B would be allowed an interest abatement, despite A and B’s both being in apparently identical predicaments. Petitioner contends that no justifica- tion exists for this disparate treatment. Petitioner faces daunting odds, though, because such fine distinctions are common in the law, and particularly common in tax law. Courts have long held that “[l]egislatures have especially broad latitude in creating classifications and distinctions in tax statutes.” Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983). And the burden is on the taxpayer to negate “every conceivable basis which might support it.” Id. at 547-548. This judicial deference flows from a recognition that--as a practical matter--Congress will often have to draw distinctions between different taxpayers who seem in some ways to be inPage: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Next
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