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that date, unfairly discriminated between two classes of
similarly situated taxpayers.
He asks us to imagine two taxpayers, A and B. A has a
deficiency for the 1996 tax year, and B has one for the 1997 tax
year. A and B are dealing with the same IRS agent, who while
handling their cases is sent for a prolonged bout of training
(clearly a managerial act) that causes unreasonable delays in the
resolution of both cases. If the effective date of new section
6404(e) is constitutional, however, only B would be allowed an
interest abatement, despite A and B’s both being in apparently
identical predicaments. Petitioner contends that no justifica-
tion exists for this disparate treatment.
Petitioner faces daunting odds, though, because such fine
distinctions are common in the law, and particularly common in
tax law. Courts have long held that “[l]egislatures have
especially broad latitude in creating classifications and
distinctions in tax statutes.” Regan v. Taxation With
Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983). And the
burden is on the taxpayer to negate “every conceivable basis
which might support it.” Id. at 547-548.
This judicial deference flows from a recognition that--as a
practical matter--Congress will often have to draw distinctions
between different taxpayers who seem in some ways to be in
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