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Discussion
Although petitioner makes passing efforts to argue that the
effective date doesn’t mean what it says4 or fails to correctly
reflect Congress’s intent,5 his main argument is grounded in
equal protection law.6 He contends that all victims of
managerial errors committed after July 30, 1996 should be treated
equally; and that Congress, by applying new section 6404(e)'s
interest abatement provisions only to tax years beginning after
4 He suggests that the effective date provision was an
oversight by Congress that is capable of judicial revision.
However, we note that new section 6404(e)'s effective date is but
one of many in that section of Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2--notably
including the one governing the right to judicial review
(formerly section 6404(g), now section 6404(h)), Pub. L. 104-168
sec. 302 (effective date based on time of request for interest
abatement). Even if we had a general power of judicial
correction, this close proximity of different effective dates
shows that Congress did pay attention to such provisions and was
capable of making a different choice if it had wished.
5 Petitioner argues that applying the effective date as
written would thwart Congress’s clearly expressed intent that
taxpayers not suffer the ill effects of bureaucratic gaffes by
the IRS. But his only evidence of this intent is a quote that
the purpose of amending section 6404 was “to provide for
increased protections of taxpayer rights in complying with the
Internal Revenue Code . . . .” H. Rept. 104-506 at 22 (1996),
1996-3 C.B. 49, 70. So general a statement of legislative
purpose is insufficient to overcome the plain meaning of the
amendment’s effective date.
6 The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides
guarantees against the Federal Government that are essentially
identical to those provided against the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497, 499 (1954).
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