Charles Durham - Page 10

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          336 (1989), petitioner’s problem is that any rational basis--               
          whether articulated by Congress or hypothesized by a court--will            
          suffice.8                                                                   
               One obvious rational basis for new section 6404(e)’s                   
          effective date is simple administrative convenience.  In enacting           
          new section 6404(e), Congress needed to define the situations               
          that would and would not be subject to its provisions.  Taking              
          into account that income taxes are levied on an annual basis, it            
          was rational for Congress to restrict the amendment’s application           
          by tax year, limited to liabilities for tax years beginning after           
          the date of enactment and so giving the IRS some time to adjust             
          its own administrative routine at a lower cost to the Government.           
          Considerations of administrative convenience have long been                 
          recognized as a valid reason for legislative line drawing.  See             
          N.Y. Rapid Transit, 303 U.S. at 580-581; Carmichael v. S. Coal &            
          Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 511 (1937).  We need not, indeed we must            
          not, engage in judicial second-guessing of such a legislative               
          decision:  “The fact that another reasonable classification or              


               8 Courts have traditionally granted even greater deference             
          to distinctions drawn by tax laws than they have to distinctions            
          drawn by laws in other “rational basis” areas.  See, e.g., Kelso,           
          “Equal Protection After the Rational Basis Era:  Is it Time to              
          Reassess the Current Standards of Review?”, 4 U. Pa. J. Const. L.           
          225, 230-231 (2002) (recognizing that there exists a “second-               
          order” rational review more stringent than the one applied in               
          Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal).                                                 







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