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case at hand, Petitioner and Jane Parker formed an implied
consensual recognition at the time of the fraudulent sale to
later reverse the transaction.”
Firstly, petitioner conflates the restriction-on-use
question with the obligation-to-repay question.
Secondly, petitioner does not state what restrictions there
were, nor does he even ask us to make a finding of fact that
there were restrictions.
Thirdly, in Nordberg there was evidence as to what the
taxpayer did with the money he received. 79 T.C. at 662-664.
There is no such evidence in the record in the instant case. We
may fairly assume that petitioner is in a far better position
than respondent to know what he in fact used the $100,000 for and
what, if any, restrictions were imposed on his use of this money.
From petitioner’s failure to present to the Court evidence as to
(1) what he did with the money and (2) what restrictions, if any,
were imposed on the use of the money, we infer that if such
evidence had been presented, then it would have been harmful to
petitioner. See O’Dwyer v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 575, 584 (4th
Cir. 1959), affg. 28 T.C. 698, 703 (1957); Stoumen v.
Commissioner, 208 F.2d 903, 907 (3d Cir. 1953), affg. a
Memorandum Opinion of this Court dated March 13, 1953; Wichita
Terminal Elevator Co. v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 1158, 1165 (1946),
affd. 162 F.2d 513 (10th Cir. 1947).
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