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funds at some future point” will not suffice to take the
transaction out of the ambit of the claim of right doctrine.
Professional Insurance Agents v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 246, 270
(1982), and cases there cited, affd. 726 F.2d 1097 (6th Cir.
1984).
Secondly, petitioner does not enlighten us as to what it was
that he recognized so that we might judge whether that amounted
to a fixed and not a contingent obligation. Nor does petitioner
enlighten us as to whether this “implied consensual recognition”
was formed in 1996 and not at a later date. Nor does petitioner
enlighten us as to what provisions for repayment, if any, he made
in 1996. Cf. Nordberg v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. at 662-663, 665-
666.
Thirdly, petitioner states that the bankruptcy court’s
decision “caused the realization of the pre-existing obligation
to repay Jane Parker”. It is far from clear what this is
intended to mean. It suggests that the “pre-existing obligation”
was not “real” until the bankruptcy court entered the consent
order on February 4, 2000. That in turn suggests that, in 1996,
there was not any existing and fixed obligation to repay; it
further suggests that, if there was any 1996 “implied consensual
recognition” of anything, then that implied consensual
recognition may have been an understanding that the $100,000
might have to be repaid if petitioner got caught.
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Last modified: May 25, 2011