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Fifthly, the lack of evidence--or even clear assertions--as
to what petitioner did in 1996 with regard to a supposedly then-
fixed obligation, combined with petitioner’s delay until 2000 in
acknowledging an obligation, combined with petitioner’s failure
through September 25, 2003, to repay any significant part (or
perhaps any part at all) of the $100,000, cause us to conclude,
and we have found, that it is more likely than not that (1)
petitioner did not recognize in 1996 an existing and fixed
obligation to repay the $100,000, and (2) petitioner did not make
in 1996 provisions to repay the $100,000.
3. Loan
Petitioner urges us to apply the substance over form
doctrine and, on answering brief, refers to “the $100,000 Jane
Parker loaned Petitioner in 1996.” We have stated that
it is the substance of a transaction rather than mere form
which should determine the resultant tax consequences when
the form does not coincide with economic reality.
Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945);
Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940); Foster v.
Commissioner, 80 T.C. 34, 201 (1983)[affd. in part and
vacated in part 756 F.2d 1430 (9th Cir. 1985)]; Gray v.
Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1032 (1971). The taxpayer, as well as
the Commissioner, is entitled to assert the substance-over-
form argument although in such situations taxpayers may face
a higher than usual burden of proof. * * * [Glacier State
Electric Supply Co. v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1047, 1053
(1983).]
It is not clear whether petitioner’s “loan” contention is
intended to be (1) an alternative or (2) merely an attempt to
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