Richard R. Hamlett - Page 12

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               From the foregoing, we conclude, and we have found, that it            
          is more likely than not that the $100,000 was received without              
          restriction as to its disposition by petitioner, and there were             
          not any such restrictions in effect in 1996.                                
               2.  Obligation To Repay; Provisions for Repayment                      
               In the instant case, the record does not include any                   
          evidence that in 1996 petitioner recognized his liability to                
          repay the $100,000, nor does the record include any evidence that           
          in 1996 petitioner made provisions for repaying the $100,000.  As           
          noted supra, petitioner stated on brief that he and Parker                  
          “formed an implied consensual recognition * * * to later reverse            
          the transaction.”  On brief, petitioner supports this implied               
          agreement, as follows:                                                      
               The subsequent action of the Bankruptcy Court, voiding the             
               fraudulent transaction, did not create an obligation to                
               repay the $100,000.00.  The bankruptcy court’s decision                
               instead caused the realization of the pre-existing                     
               obligation to repay Jane Parker by voiding the transfer of             
               Petitioner’s stock in Centurion Investments and Roanoke                
               Development.  This result is supported by the inherent                 
               nature and purpose of the fraud perpetrated as well as the             
               immediate, voluntary drafting and signing of a promissory              
               note between Petitioner and Jane Parker on the date that the           
               Bankruptcy Court voided the transaction.                               
               Firstly, petitioner does not ask us to make a finding of               
          fact that there was an agreement or other recognition by him in             
          1996 that he had an “existing and fixed obligation to repay” the            
          $100,000, or that in 1996 petitioner made provisions to repay the           
          $100,000.  Note that “a contingent obligation to restore the                

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