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From the foregoing, we conclude, and we have found, that it
is more likely than not that the $100,000 was received without
restriction as to its disposition by petitioner, and there were
not any such restrictions in effect in 1996.
2. Obligation To Repay; Provisions for Repayment
In the instant case, the record does not include any
evidence that in 1996 petitioner recognized his liability to
repay the $100,000, nor does the record include any evidence that
in 1996 petitioner made provisions for repaying the $100,000. As
noted supra, petitioner stated on brief that he and Parker
“formed an implied consensual recognition * * * to later reverse
the transaction.” On brief, petitioner supports this implied
agreement, as follows:
The subsequent action of the Bankruptcy Court, voiding the
fraudulent transaction, did not create an obligation to
repay the $100,000.00. The bankruptcy court’s decision
instead caused the realization of the pre-existing
obligation to repay Jane Parker by voiding the transfer of
Petitioner’s stock in Centurion Investments and Roanoke
Development. This result is supported by the inherent
nature and purpose of the fraud perpetrated as well as the
immediate, voluntary drafting and signing of a promissory
note between Petitioner and Jane Parker on the date that the
Bankruptcy Court voided the transaction.
Firstly, petitioner does not ask us to make a finding of
fact that there was an agreement or other recognition by him in
1996 that he had an “existing and fixed obligation to repay” the
$100,000, or that in 1996 petitioner made provisions to repay the
$100,000. Note that “a contingent obligation to restore the
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