- 36 -
provided for in the Thompson settlement.” Id. n.11. On April
18, 2003, in accordance with its opinion in Dixon V, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued its mandate reversing and
remanding the Tax Court’s decisions in the test cases.27
On February 20, 2004, petitioners Jesse M. and Lura L. Lewis
filed and lodged the motions before us, seeking to have their
stipulated decisions of 1993 vacated, and to have their cases
reopened to enable them to obtain the benefits of the Thompson
settlement, as mandated by the Court of Appeals, with respect to
“appellants and all other taxpayers properly before this Court”.
They maintain they “were legally bound by the Dixon lead cases by
virtue of a ‘Piggy Back agreement’ that requires consistent
treatment and identifies them as group members”. They urge that
the Court of Appeals’ holding of fraud on the Court in Dixon V
justifies granting them leave to file their motions to vacate.
On July 9, 2004, respondent filed objections to petitioners’
motion to vacate. Respondent argued that petitioners, by
27 On July 11, 2000, shortly after the test case petitioners
had filed their notices of appeal, this Court had certified
certain dispositive orders in the nontest cases for interlocutory
appeal, and appeals were taken in these cases. In an order dated
Mar. 14, 2003, another panel of the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit remanded the cases of various non-test-case
petitioners represented by Messrs. Izen, Sticht, Jones, and
O’Donnell for further proceedings consistent with the opinion in
Dixon V. These nontest cases have been consolidated with the
remaining test cases for the purpose of applying the outstanding
mandates of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit regarding
the terms, interpretation, and application of the Thompson
settlement.
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