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strongly supported * * * by the Supreme Court in Hazel-Atlas
Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238”. Toscano v.
Commissioner, supra at 933 (citing Kenner v. Commissioner,
supra).
Petitioners’ principal claim in these cases is that they
were victimized by the fraud on the Court whose predicate facts
were disclosed before they agreed to settle. They maintain that
they were legally bound by the outcome of the test cases by
virtue of their piggyback agreements and are therefore entitled
to “consistent treatment”. That consistent treatment, they
maintain, is the “target or model settlement to be followed,
i.e., the Thompson settlement”. They conclude that “they should
have leave of this Court to file appropriate papers that would
include them in the remand group of Dixon III” (i.e., Dixon V).
Petitioners’ claim ignores the legal consequences of their
superseding agreements to settle. The compromise and settlement
of tax cases is governed by general principles of contract law.
See Dorchester Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. 320, 330
(1997), affd. without published opinion 208 F.3d 205 (3d Cir.
2000). A settlement stipulation is a contract. Each party
agrees to concede some rights that he or she may assert against
his or her adversary as consideration for other rights secured in
the settlement agreement. See Saigh v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.
171, 177 (1956). Petitioners’ agreement with respondent acted
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