- 41 -
Allowing motions to vacate * * * after a
deliberate choice has been made not to appeal, would
allow litigants to circumvent the appeals process and
would undermine greatly the policies supporting
finality of judgments. Litigants unsuccessful at trial
could forego available appeals and, should subsequent
decisions in other cases render their positions viable,
they could move to have adverse judgments vacated. The
uncertainty resulting from such a rule would be
unacceptable.
Although Ackermann and Plotkin involved litigants’ decisions
not to appeal, their holdings also apply to motions to vacate.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has explained:
We find no meaningful distinction between a motion
asking for relief from a decision not to appeal, as in
Ackermann, and one that asks for relief from a decision
to settle, as in this case. The decision to settle a
case is made in the same manner as any other decision
with respect to the course of litigation, including a
decision not to appeal. A litigant weighs the chance
of success against the probable cost of achieving that
success through further litigation, all based on
whatever limited information is available at the time.
* * * [Schwartz v. United States, 976 F.2d 213, 218-219
(4th Cir. 1992).]
Thus, a party making “a conscious and informed choice of
litigation strategy * * * cannot in hindsight seek extraordinary
relief” from the consequences of that choice. United States v.
Bank of N.Y., 14 F.3d 756, 759 (2d Cir. 1994). “To hold
otherwise would undermine the finality of judgments in the
litigation process.” Id. (citing Ackermann v. United States,
supra, and denying a motion for relief from a consent decree
entered pursuant to a settlement agreement).
Page: Previous 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011