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run from the entry of the order disposing of the motion or from
the entry of a new decision, whichever is later. Fed. R. App. P.
13(a)(2). Thereafter, as a general rule, the Tax Court lacks
jurisdiction to vacate a decision that has become final.
Billingsley v. Commissioner, 868 F.2d 1081, 1084-1085 (9th Cir.
1989); Abatti v. Commissioner, 859 F.2d 115, 117 (9th Cir. 1988),
affg. 86 T.C. 1319 (1986).
The strictness of the finality rules is intentional. “The
legislative history shows that Congress was conscious of the need
that ‘finality’ be clearly defined, so that the process of
collection can proceed unimpeded. Court decisions, supporting
this objective, have been strict in applying the statute.”
Toscano v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d 930, 932 (9th Cir. 1971),
vacating and remanding 52 T.C. 295 (1969). The statutory
framework finds support in the strong policy of finality in our
decisions. See Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 15, 28
(2004); Cinema ‘84 v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 264 (2004), affd.
412 F.3d 366 (2d Cir. 2005); Taub v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 741,
751 (1975), affd. without published opinion 538 F.2d 314 (2d Cir.
1976); see also Calderone v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-151.
As the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit explained, in
affirming one of our decisions in Abatti v. Commissioner, supra
at 119: “Exceptions which would allow final decisions to be
reconsidered must be construed narrowly in order to preserve the
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