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circumstances of their agreements to settle justify relief from
the finality of the resulting decisions. They argue that they
settled on the premise that “no fraud on the Court existed” and
“that the Thompson scenario was harmless”. These arguments do
not withstand scrutiny.
It is axiomatic that knowledge of the facts precludes a
claim of fraud. Soliman v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 311 F.3d 966,
975 (9th Cir. 2002); see Melanson v. United Air Lines, Inc., 931
F.2d 558, 563 (9th Cir. 1991) (fraudulent failure to disclose
requires a plaintiff unaware of the concealed fact who would not
have acted had he known of the fact); 37 C.J.S., Fraud, sec. 37
(1997) (“one can secure no redress for a representation which he
knew to be false or for failure to disclose facts which he knew
to exist”).
Petitioners do not deny that, when they agreed to settle
their cases, they had learned of the previously secret deal--
namely, that respondent’s attorneys McWade and Sims had
engineered a settlement with a party-witness in the test cases
who thereby became entitled to the better of his settlement or
the resulting decision of the Court.
There is ample evidence in the record that petitioners had
become aware of those facts. In July 1992, Mr. Kersting informed
the Kersting project participants of the recently disclosed,
previously secret McWade/DeCastro agreement. Mr. Kersting
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