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attorneys, the Court may determine facts based upon “expected
contradictory testimony.” Respondent’s concession of the need
for a hearing, however, occurred before the evidentiary hearings
in 1996 and 1997 on remand from DuFresne. Those hearings
required more than 5 weeks of trial and produced hundreds of
exhibits and thousands of pages of testimony regarding the
misconduct of the Government’s attorneys. The Court agrees with
respondent that no further testimony is needed to enable the
Court to decide petitioners’ motions for leave.
Petitioners also ask for a hearing so that they might
expose: “the scheme whereby CID alleged agents would call on
investors to frighten them about a possible indictment against
them, personally. Then a project attorney from Hawaii would call
to offer not only the 7% settlement, but, also, certain freedom
from the CID.” This bare assertion is irrelevant to the present
proceeding. The relief that petitioners seek in this case was
mandated by the Court of Appeals as a result of Messrs. Sims’s
and McWade’s failure to disclose the Thompson settlement, not as
a result of alleged objectionable telephone calls by agents of
the Internal Revenue Service. See Harbold v. Commissioner, 51
F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 1995).
Finally, petitioners’ supplement to their motion for leave
fails to supply any reason to grant the relief petitioners seek.
In the supplement, Messrs. O’Donnell and Jones address
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