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them. We concluded early on that, when that happens, we should
keep deciding cases as we think right. Lawrence v. Commissioner,
27 T.C. 713, 717 (1957), revd. 258 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1958). And
although we also recognize an exception to that rule--we won’t
follow our precedent in a case appealable to a circuit where we
would surely be reversed, see Lardas v. Commissioner, 99 T.C.
490, 495 (1992), explaining Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742
(1970), affd. 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971)--we do not always
wait for the Supreme Court to restore consistency in construing
the Tax Code when one or more circuit courts disagree with us.
As we said nearly fifty years ago, we have “no desire to ignore
or lightly regard any decisions of those courts,” and have “not
infrequently * * * been persuaded by the reasoning of opinions of
those courts to change [our] views on various questions being
litigated.” Lawrence, 27 T.C. at 717.
The opinions in Ewing I and Bartman change the judicial
landscape, see Robinson v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 44, 51 (2002),
and so we now reconsider our earlier reading of section 6015(e).
In Ewing I, we thought that reading the key phrase in the
amendment--“In the case of an individual against whom a
deficiency has been asserted”--as limiting our jurisdiction made
little sense if the remaining language, as we had construed it in
Butler and Fernandez, continued to allow us to grant subsection
(f) relief. This did not read the amendment entirely out of the
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