David Bruce Billings - Page 23

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          in part and vacating in part T.C. Memo. 2004-93; see Commissioner           
          v. Ewing, 439 F.3d at 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2006).  Given such a             
          plain reading, it is improper for the Court to resort to the                
          legislative history of section 6015(e)(1) to change that reading.           
          In accordance with deeply ingrained principles of statutory                 
          construction, the Court must apply section 6015(e)(1) according             
          to its terms,4 see Commissioner v. Soliman, 506 U.S. 168, 174               
          (1993); Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 n.3 (1984);                
          Venture Funding, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 236, 241-242                
          (1998), affd. without published opinion 198 F.3d 248 (6th Cir.              
          1999), and must not resort to the legislative history of the                
          statute to find ambiguities in its terms so as to apply those               
          terms inconsistently with their plain meaning, see Commissioner             
          v. Ewing, 439 F.3d at 1013.  See Ewing v. Commissioner, 118 T.C.            
          at 511-514 (Laro, J., dissenting) (discussing the plain meaning             
          of the terms in section 6015(e)(1) vis-a-vis the reading given              
          those terms by the Court’s opinion in that case).  Accordingly,             
          unless the Court finds that all three of the referenced                     
          requirements have been met, section 6015(e)(1) does not allow the           

               4 Although the legislative history to a statute may                    
          sometimes override the statute’s plain meaning interpretation and           
          lead to a different result where the statute’s history contains             
          unequivocal evidence of a clear legislative intent, see Consumer            
          Prod. Safety Commn. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108                
          (1980); see also Allen v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 1, 17 (2002),              
          the legislative history underlying sec. 6015(e)(1) supports the             
          conclusions set forth in this concurring opinion.  See Ewing v.             
          Commissioner, 118 T.C. at 522-526 (Laro, J., dissenting).                   

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