- 17 - statute, but led us to view it (especially in light of its legislative history) merely as a new timing requirement aimed at limiting speculative claims for innocent spouse relief. Cf. Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (cautioning against comparisons between amended statutes and their predecessors to find ambiguity). After the opinions in Ewing I and Bartman, however, this reading becomes problematic, particularly when we consider that “deficiency” itself has a defined meaning--the amount by which the tax imposed by the Internal Revenue Code exceeds the amount reported on a return, including an amended return. We now hold, consistently with those opinions, that the phrase establishes a condition precedent: A petitioner in this Court who seeks judicial review of a denial of relief must show that the Commissioner asserts that he owes more in tax than reported on his return. By amending section 6015 the way it did, Congress narrowed the class of individuals able to invoke our jurisdiction under section 6015(e)(1)(A) to those “against whom a deficiency has been asserted.” We cannot fairly read Congress’s phrasing of this qualification as other than a clear, though perhaps inadvertent, deprivation of our jurisdiction over nondeficiency stand-alone petitions. Placing that circumscription where it did, the “assertion of a deficiency” has become the “ticket to Tax Court” that notices of deficiency are in redetermination cases.Page: Previous 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 Next
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