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statute, but led us to view it (especially in light of its
legislative history) merely as a new timing requirement aimed at
limiting speculative claims for innocent spouse relief. Cf.
Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004)
(cautioning against comparisons between amended statutes and
their predecessors to find ambiguity).
After the opinions in Ewing I and Bartman, however, this
reading becomes problematic, particularly when we consider that
“deficiency” itself has a defined meaning--the amount by which
the tax imposed by the Internal Revenue Code exceeds the amount
reported on a return, including an amended return. We now hold,
consistently with those opinions, that the phrase establishes a
condition precedent: A petitioner in this Court who seeks
judicial review of a denial of relief must show that the
Commissioner asserts that he owes more in tax than reported on
his return. By amending section 6015 the way it did, Congress
narrowed the class of individuals able to invoke our jurisdiction
under section 6015(e)(1)(A) to those “against whom a deficiency
has been asserted.” We cannot fairly read Congress’s phrasing of
this qualification as other than a clear, though perhaps
inadvertent, deprivation of our jurisdiction over nondeficiency
stand-alone petitions. Placing that circumscription where it
did, the “assertion of a deficiency” has become the “ticket to
Tax Court” that notices of deficiency are in redetermination
cases.
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