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history to be effective is, we think, a misreckoning after Ewing
I and Bartman.
We therefore overrule our holding in Ewing I in light of
this subsequent precedent and now construe section 6015(e) as not
giving us jurisdiction over nondeficiency stand-alone
petitions.10 But if we now think the disputed phrase is not
ambiguous, its effect still seems to us anomalous. The
legislative history that we reviewed in Ewing I strongly hints
that limiting our jurisdiction was not the purpose Congress had
in mind in passing the amendment. Still, "Congress enacts
statutes, not purposes, and courts may not depart from the
statutory text because they believe some other arrangement would
better serve the legislative goals." In re Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d
726, 731-732 (9th Cir. 2002). Whatever "the gap in the section
6015 procedures that this case highlights is not one that can be
closed by judicial fiat." Drake v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 320,
326 (2004).
Our reading today may also create some confusion--innocent
spouse relief under all subsections of 6015 will remain available
in this Court as an affirmative defense in deficiency
redetermination cases because of section 6213(a), as a remedy on
10 We stress that we are not revisiting our conclusion in
Butler that relief under section 6015(f) is not committed to the
Commissioner's unreviewable discretion, Butler, 114 T.C. at 290.
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