John R. Ray IV and Rochelle L. Ray - Page 13

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         longer merely a contract between private individuals but is the              
         judgment of the court.  McGuire v. McGuire, supra.                           
              In this case, the arbitration agreement and the divorce                 
         decree were made between the same parties, embraced the same                 
         subject matter, ordered the same support amounts and payment                 
         schedule, and was intended by the parties to be incorporated into            
         the divorce decree.  Under Texas law, the arbitration agreement              
         became a part of the consent judgment once it was incorporated               
         into the final divorce decree.  Therefore, by virtue of the                  
         merger, the arbitration agreement becomes an integrated part of              
         the “divorce or separation instrument” within the meaning of                 
         section 71(b).                                                               
                   Whether the Initial Payment Was Received                           
                   “Under” a Divorce or Separation Instrument                         
              The resolution of whether the Initial Payment was received              
         “under” a divorce or separation instrument turns on the question             
         of timing.  Both the arbitration agreement and the divorce decree            
         (collectively, the qualifying divorce instrument) are explicit in            
         their terms that alimony payments “will be payable beginning April           
         1, 2002”.                                                                    
              Mr. Ray contends that his legal obligation was to pay alimony           
         of $20,000.  He argues that so long as the sum of $20,000 was                
         paid, it is irrelevant whether he commenced the alimony payments             
         in March or in April of 2002.  Mr. Ray’s argument ignores the                
         question of the Initial Payment’s timing.                                    





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