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been made “under” a qualified divorce or separation instrument.
In Wells v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-2, by the express terms
of the court order, the taxpayer’s legal obligation to pay alimony
commenced on October 15, 1990. In determining whether the
taxpayer’s payments were made pursuant to a “written separation
instrument”, the Court looked to when the payments were made and
concluded that all payments made from January 1 through October
14, 1990, were not made pursuant to a “written separation
instrument”. Id.
Similarly, in Abood v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-453, by
the express terms of the court order, the taxpayer’s obligation to
pay alimony terminated on June 1, 1985. The Court held that any
payments made thereafter were purely voluntary and hence did not
qualify as alimony under sections 71(a) and 215(a). Id.; see also
Serednesky v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-566 (holding that
taxpayer may not deduct rental payments made on behalf of his
former wife as alimony, because the divorce judgment specifically
required him to provide “housing”).
Mr. Ray testified that he was told that the divorce was final
after the March 13 arbitration and that he understood this to mean
that he had a choice of when to make the first alimony payment.
Mr. Ray chose to make the Initial Payment on March 22, 2002,
because he wanted to “get it over with” and because it was
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