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intermediary, the three together could generate and share
enormous fees and profits. The three men recognized that
Kanter’s skills as an attorney, combined with his client list and
business contacts in the commercial real estate industry, neatly
complemented Ballard’s and Lisle’s ability to influence
Prudential’s business decisions pertaining to its large
commercial real estate holdings throughout the country.
Accordingly, without disclosing Ballard’s and Lisle’s direct
roles in the scheme, Kanter approached various businessmen,
including Schaffel, Frey, Schnitzer, and Eulich, and offered to
assist them in raising capital and/or obtaining property
management contracts for their businesses in exchange for a share
in the fees or profits generated by these business opportunities.
Although Kanter arranged to have these fees and profits paid to
IRA or THC (or their subsidiaries), Schaffel, Frey, Schnitzer,
and Eulich uniformly stated that they were relying on Kanter, and
Kanter alone, to provide them with the additional business
opportunities they were seeking. Largely unbeknownst to
Schaffel, Frey, Schnitzer, and Eulich, however, Kanter, Ballard,
and Lisle had agreed to share any fees and profits paid to Kanter
to the extent that Ballard and Lisle were able to exert their
influence to steer Prudential business to Kanter’s contacts.
Considering their relative positions, Kanter, Ballard, and
Lisle agreed to share the fees and profits 45 percent each to
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