Interference No. 101,981
1 and 6, 1992, respectively) after the close of the testimony
period (March 22, 1992; see paper no. 143) and Qadri filed an
opposition (paper no. 202) to which Batlogg filed a reply (paper
no. 212). The APJ (paper no. 214) had deferred decision on the
motion to final hearing. We now deny this motion.
Batlogg argues that certain statements Qadri made in their
Rule 131 affidavit and Preliminary Statement are false. The
statements are to dates of conception and reduction to practice
which are earlier than the dates Qadri now relies upon in their
Brief.
With respect to the preliminary statement, the Board has
held that statements in the Preliminary Statements are not
regarded as effective admissions except for the setting of
limiting dates.
“’[t]he Preliminary Statement, through [sic] verified and
somewhat in the nature of a pleading, is not regarded as
evidence but as merely setting dates earlier than which
evidence is not effective time-wise. Consequently the
particular statements in the Preliminary Statement are not
regarded as effective admissions except for the setting of
limiting dates.’”
Gruber v. Via, 221 USPQ 276, 279 (Bd. Pat. Int. 1982).
Qadri would not have been permitted to stipulate dates earlier
than set forth in the Preliminary Statement. The dates merely
mark an outside limitation. They are not to be viewed as a
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