Appeal No. 2000-1962
Application No. 08/697,421
conclusion, the Examiner is apparently relying on the description
of the signature token (Davies, page 380) as incorporating a secret
key, which the Examiner asserts (id.) is “... essentially a unique
human identifier.” We find no basis in the disclosure of Davies to
support this conclusion. The Examiner must not only make requisite
findings, based on the evidence of record, but must also explain
the reasoning by which the findings are deemed to support the
conclusion of obviousness. See In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1343,
61 USPQ2d 1430, 1433-34 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The only previous
reference to a secret key in the disclosure of Davies is at page
378 which, as an example of a secret key, refers to “... one which
is general to a card issuer.”
Given the above deficiencies in Davies, we agree with Appellants
that proper motivation for the Examiner’s proposed combination of
Davies and Griffith has not been established. Our review of Davies
reveals a lack of concern with the unique identification of a party
to a transaction, as defined by Appellants, let alone a unique
identification that is used to generate a unique code for a secure
transaction. Given this lack of disclosure in Davies, we find no
basis for the Examiner’s proposed addition of the human identifier
teachings of Griffith to those of Davies. In our view, any
suggestion to add such a human identifier feature as taught by
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