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those cases. In effect, petitioners seek to resurrect the
piggyback agreement offer and/or the settlement offer they
previously failed to accept.
Petitioners contend that under the principle of "equality,"
the Commissioner has a duty of consistency toward similarly
situated taxpayers and cannot tax one and not tax another without
some rational basis for the difference. United States v. Kaiser,
363 U.S. 299, 308 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., concurring opinion);
see Baker v. United States, 748 F.2d 1465 (11th Cir. 1984);
Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. United States, 476 F.2d 406 (4th
Cir. 1973). According to petitioners, the principle of equality
precludes the Commissioner from making arbitrary distinctions
between like cases. See Baker v. Commissioner, 787 F.2d 637, 643
(D.C. Cir. 1986), vacating 83 T.C. 822 (1984).
The different tax treatment accorded petitioners and Miller
was not arbitrary or irrational. While petitioners and Miller
both invested in the Plastics Recycling project, their actions
with respect to such investments provide a rational basis for
treating them differently. Miller foreclosed any potential
liability for increased interest in his cases by making payment
of the tax prior to December 31, 1984; no interest accrued after
that date. In contrast, petitioners made no such payment and
they conceded that the increased rate of interest under section
6621(c) applies in their cases. Liability for the increased rate
of interest is the principal difference between the settlement in
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