Ira S. Greene and Robin C. Greene - Page 25

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          without published opinion 40 F.3d 385 (5th Cir. 1994); Pollack v.           
          Commissioner, 47 T.C. 92, 108 (1966), affd. 392 F.2d 409 (5th               
          Cir. 1968); Wichita Terminal Elevator Co. v. Commissioner, 6 T.C.           
          1158, 1165 (1946), affd. 162 F.2d 513 (10th Cir. 1947); Sacks v.            
          Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-217.  Petitioner's memory proved              
          selective at trial.  We found his testimony self-serving and at             
          times incredible, and we are not required to accept it as true.             
          Wood v. Commissioner, 338 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1964), affg. 41           
          T.C. 593 (1964); Niedringhaus v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 202, 212             
          (1992); Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74, 77 (1986).                    
               We hold that petitioner's purported reliance on Marcus and             
          Hefter was not reasonable, not in good faith, and not based upon            
          full disclosure.  Neither Marcus nor Hefter had any experience or           
          expertise in plastics materials or plastics recycling.                      
          Petitioner did not know, and did not ask, whether Marcus had                
          researched or investigated Resource or the Plastics Recycling               
          transactions.  The record is consistent with the conclusion that            
          Marcus received a commission as the "offeree representative" in             
          connection with the sale of a partnership interest to petitioner.           
          Hefter did nothing more than review the offering memorandum and             
          could only offer that the Resource transaction "appeared" valid             
          based on the representations therein.  A taxpayer may rely upon             
          his advisers' expertise (in this case bankruptcy law and                    
          accounting), but it is not reasonable or prudent to rely upon an            
          adviser regarding matters outside of his field of expertise or              




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