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support payments made by petitioner, from evidence”. Respondent
also moved to exclude from evidence: (1) The August 16, 1996,
order of the Superior Court, in which the court attempted to
clarify the character of the family support payments; and (2) the
“Dissomaster” report.
Petitioner introduced the above evidence to establish that
88 percent of the family support payments represented alimony.
Respondent objects to the introduction of the evidence, relying
upon the parol evidence rule and the Supreme Court's holding in
Commissioner v. Lester, supra.5 In essence, respondent asserts
that since the MTA clearly characterizes the full amount of the
family support payments as child support pursuant to section
71(c)(2), the introduction of extrinsic evidence is
inappropriate. We reserved a final ruling as to the
admissibility of the evidence and tentatively received the
evidence offered. Respondent renewed the objection at trial and
again on brief.
This Court has held, relying on the holding in Lester, that
parol and other extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to explain the
intent, motives, and conduct of parties where a clear and
5 Respondent also objects to the “Dissomaster” report on
the basis of relevance, asserting that at no time during the
relevant period did petitioner pay Ms. Wells $3,238 per month,
the amount indicated in the report. While it is true that
petitioner paid less than $3,238 per month, the objection is
overruled, as it goes to the weight of the evidence rather than
to its admissibility.
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