- 16 -
etc.) or petitioner’s (i.e., that paragraph 14C. required family
support payments that were not subject to any of the above
events). If we concur with respondent, then both petitioner and
Ms. Wells had, once again, “otherwise agreed in writing” and the
result would mirror the above.7
On the other hand, even if we were to concur with
petitioner’s interpretation of the Modified MTA, he still would
not prevail. We are unaware of any California statute that
terminates family support obligations upon the death of the payee
spouse. California Family Code section 4337 pertains only to
spousal support orders and, in our estimation, does not address
family support payments. Assuming a “worst case scenario” (i.e.,
custodial parent dies and custody is awarded to someone other
than the surviving spouse), we cannot believe that California law
would permit the surviving parent to avoid any further support
obligations. See Murphy v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-258.
Accordingly, respondent’s determination shall be sustained.
To reflect the foregoing,
Respondent’s motion in limine
will be denied and decision will
be entered for respondent.
7 A holding in accordance with respondent’s interpretation,
however, would require us to find that petitioner and Ms. Wells
continued to ignore the patent ambiguity of the one-child
provision.
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