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Respondent asserts that Grummer v. Commissioner, supra, is
indistinguishable from this case. We disagree. In Grummer, this
Court, in excluding extrinsic evidence, found that there was no
ambiguity in the language of the agreement and that “The parties
stated with clarity that the periodic payments were to be treated
solely as support for the children.” Id. at 679. No such
clarity, however, is present in the documents before us.
Accordingly, we deny respondent’s motion in limine and overrule
all related subsequent objections.
Petitioner, on the other hand, raises a relevancy objection
to the introduction of a Minute Order of the Superior Court filed
May 17, 1995. The order required petitioner to pay Ms. Wells
$2,222 per month as “child support” and $275 per month as
alimony, “COMMENCING FORTHWITH” from the date the Minute Order
was filed. We sustain petitioner’s objection. This order
modified petitioner’s payments beginning with June 1, 1995, and
thereafter and has no bearing on petitioner’s payments made
during taxable years 1990 and 1991. The order, in stating the
“COURT RESERVES ISSUE OF RETROACTIVITY AS TO COMMENCEMENT OF
SUPPORT ORDERS”, implies that its effectiveness is limited to
modifying petitioner’s future support obligations only.
Divorce or Separation Instrument
While respondent does not question whether, under section
71(b)(1)(A), petitioner had made payments pursuant to a divorce
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