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survives the death of the custodial parent), and we refuse to
accept his conclusion.
Upon reviewing the relevant evidence before us, we hold that
petitioner’s payments, under both instruments, do not meet the
section 71(b)(1)(D) requirement. Contrary to petitioner’s
contention, California Family Code section 4337 (West 1994) does
not assist him in satisfying that provision.
While the MTA is not a model of clarity, we are convinced
that the parties intended the payments to terminate, on a pro
rata basis, as each child “marries, dies, is emancipated, reaches
19 or reaches 18 and is not a full-time high school student
residing with a parent”. The reference to “the child” was merely
a scrivener’s error that was not caught by Mr. Young or his
clients. Thus, both petitioner and Ms. Wells had “otherwise
agreed in writing” to terminate the family support payments at
some point other than the death of the payee spouse. In effect,
they had agreed that the payments were to continue until one or
more of the specified events occurred with respect to the
children, even if Ms. Wells were to die beforehand. Thus, the
payments would not terminate on her death.
Turning now to the Modified MTA, it does not make any
difference whether we accept respondent’s interpretation of that
document (i.e., that paragraph 14C. required payment of $2,600
per month, terminating pro rata as each child marries, dies,
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