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or separation instrument, we believe that this issue deserves our
consideration. Section 71(b)(2) defines the term “divorce or
separation instrument” as follows:
(A) a decree of divorce or separate maintenance or
a written instrument incident to such a decree,
(B) a written separation agreement, or
(C) a decree (not described in subparagraph (A))
requiring a spouse to make payments for the support or
maintenance of the other spouse.
The term “written separation agreement” is not comprehensively
defined by the Code, the legislative history, or applicable
regulations. Bogard v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 97, 100 (1972). We
have held, however, that the existence of a clear, written
statement of the terms of support for separated parties is
sufficient to satisfy section 71(b)(2)(B). Id. at 101.
The parties have stipulated that petitioner had made the
payments at issue pursuant to the Modified MTA. Ordinarily, a
stipulation of fact is binding on the parties, and we are
constrained to enforce it. Rule 91. We may, however, modify or
set aside a stipulation that is clearly contrary to the facts
revealed on the record. Cal-Maine Foods, Inc. v. Commissioner,
93 T.C. 181, 195 (1989). The record plainly demonstrates that
the January 1 through October 14, 1990, payments, were not made
pursuant to the Modified MTA. We, therefore, shall set aside the
above stipulation pertaining to those payments. The stipulation
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