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the tribe had the right to earn revenue or income and then to
distribute these funds directly to the members of the tribe as
per capita payments.” As petitioner stresses in his brief, the
tribal constitution and the corporate charter predate the IGRA by
approximately 50 years.
Evidence regarding the meaning and application of the tribal
constitution and the corporate charter could have been admitted
during the trial of Campbell I. It was not. See Jones v. United
States, 466 F.2d 131, 136 (10th Cir. 1972); Monahan v.
Commissioner, 109 T.C. at 246. Petitioner’s argument is nothing
more than an alternative argument in support of his position on
the identical issue presented in Campbell I. Petitioner did not
make this argument in the earlier proceeding. As a general rule,
taxpayers are not permitted to avoid the application of
collateral estoppel simply by advancing new theories on issues
decided against them in an earlier proceeding. See Leininger v.
Commissioner, 86 F.2d 791, 792 (6th Cir. 1936), affg. 29 B.T.A.
874 (1934); Estate of Goldenberg v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1964-134; Pelham Hall Co. v. Carney, 27 F. Supp. 388 (D. Mass.
1939), affd. 111 F.2d 944 (1st Cir. 1940). Indeed, had the
present case been consolidated for trial with Campbell I, “one
uniform result would necessarily have obtained”.15 Peck v.
15It is noteworthy that, in making his argument that the
applicable legal climate has changed since the year at issue in
(continued...)
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