- 11 -
U.S. 147, 153 (1979) (citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439
U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979)); see also Commissioner v. Sunnen, supra
at 599-600; Popp Telcom v. American Sharecom, Inc., 210 F.3d 928,
939 (8th Cir. 2000); Monahan v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. 235, 240
(1997), affd. without published opinion 86 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir.
1996); Kroh v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 383, 401 (1992); Gammill v.
Commissioner, 62 T.C. 607, 613 (1974).
In Montana v. United States, supra at 155, the Supreme Court
established a three-prong test for applying collateral estoppel
that requires a court to find: (1) The issues presented in the
subsequent litigation are in substance the same as those issues
presented in the first case; (2) the controlling facts or legal
principles have not changed significantly since the first
judgment; and (3) other special circumstances do not warrant an
exception to the normal rules of preclusion. In Peck v.
Commissioner, 90 T.C. 162, 166 (1988), affd. 904 F.2d 525 (9th
Cir. 1990), we stated that the "three-pronged rubric provided by
the Supreme Court in the Montana case embodies a number of
detailed tests developed by the courts to test the
9(...continued)
involving the same parties or their privies based on the same
cause of action.” Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322,
326 n.5 (1979). In this case, petitioner disputes different tax
years than in Campbell I. “Each year is the origin of a new
liability and of a separate cause of action.” Commissioner v.
Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 598 (1948); see also Peck v. Commissioner,
904 F.2d 525, 527 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990), affg. 90 T.C. 162 (1988).
Res judicata, therefore, does not apply.
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