Joseph B. Campbell - Page 13




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               In both Campbell I and this case, the ultimate issue                   
          presented is whether per capita distributions to petitioner from            
          the tribe arising out of the ownership and operation of a                   
          gambling casino constitute gross income.  In this case, the                 
          parties stipulated that the primary issue in Campbell I was the             
          tax treatment of a per capita distribution to petitioner in 1992            
          from the tribe arising out of the ownership and operation of the            
          casino.                                                                     
               In Campbell I, we specifically stated that the primary issue           
          for decision was:                                                           
               Whether per capita distributions to petitioner from the                
               * * * [tribe] arising out of the ownership and                         
               operation of a gambling casino constitute gross income,                
               or whether such income is “derived directly” from land                 
               owned by the * * * [tribe] and is excludable from                      
               taxation pursuant to laws, treaties, or agreements                     
               between Indian tribes and the United States Government                 
               * * *.  [Campbell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-                    
               502.]                                                                  
          The only differences between the issue in this case and the issue           
          in Campbell I are the dollar amounts and years in controversy.              
          The fact that the dollar amounts in controversy and the tax years           
          involved in this case are different from those in Campbell I,               
          however, does not preclude the application of collateral                    
          estoppel.  See Union Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 220,            




               10(...continued)                                                       
          the Court.                                                                  





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