Joseph B. Campbell - Page 18

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          effect on the outcome of Campbell I or has any effect on this               
          case.  Regardless of petitioner’s failure to point to any                   
          specific changes in the law, we find that none of the amendments            
          enacted after the decision in Campbell I has any bearing                    
          whatsoever on the resolution of the issue in this case.  We also            
          note that we specifically addressed the IGRA in our decision in             
          Campbell I.  See Campbell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-502.             
               Petitioner sets forth several alternative arguments in this            
          case to support his contention that the per capita distributions            
          should not be subject to Federal income taxes that were not made            
          in Campbell I.14  One of those arguments, which petitioner                  
          describes as his “primary argument”, is that “the United States             
          approved a Constitution and a Corporate Charter for the                     
          * * * [tribe] in Minnesota.  * * *  These documents indicate that           

               14Petitioner also reiterated an argument he made in Campbell           
          I based on Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956).  Petitioner               
          asserted that under Squire v. Capoeman, supra at 4, income                  
          “derived directly” from the land, including per capita                      
          distributions, is exempt from taxation.  Petitioner asserted that           
          a portion of the per capita distributions received was from                 
          business income earned from operations other than gaming, such as           
          a restaurant, a buffet, two “snack-bars”, a gift shop, a tobacco            
          shop, a marina, and an RV park-campground.  This exact argument             
          was the crux of petitioner’s argument in Campbell I, and we                 
          decline to consider the argument a second time.  See Campbell v.            
          Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-502.  In Campbell I, we                       
          specifically considered Squire v. Capoeman, supra, and held:                
          “Income earned through the investment of capital or labor, such             
          as restaurants, motels, tobacco shops, and similar improvements             
          to the land, fails to qualify for the exemption * * *.  Under the           
          rationale of these cases, the income derived from the operation             
          of a casino would not be derived directly from the land.”                   
          (Citations omitted.).                                                       

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