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proceedings in those types of cases would be inconsistent with
the approach we suggested in our Ewing dissent. Contrary to the
majority’s assertion, we have limited our review to the
administrative record in those types of cases. See Houston
Lawyer Referral Serv., Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 570, 577
(1978) (“To allow oral testimony * * * as to facts not otherwise
in the administrative record to be introduced in evidence * * *
in a section 7428 declaratory judgment proceeding would convert
that proceeding from a judicial review of administrative action
to a trial de novo” and “would permit an applicant [for tax-
exempt status] to withhold information from the Internal Revenue
Service and then to introduce it before the Court”); Tamko
Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 824, 837 (1979)
(rejecting the argument of the taxpayer in a section 7476
proceeding “that it is entitled to a trial as in any other matter
before this Court”, the Court reasoned that “[t]o permit
extrinsic evidence, other than that present in the administrative
record, would convert a declaratory judgment proceeding from a
7(...continued)
consistently conducted trials on the issue of whether the
Commissioner’s denial of a request to abate interest under
section 6404 was an abuse of discretion.” Majority op. pp. 25-
26. In neither case did the Court address the issue of the
appropriate scope of review. Although the issue is not before us
today, we would conclude that, for the same reasons discussed
herein and in our Ewing dissent, our review of the Commissioner’s
interest abatement determinations is not properly the subject of
de novo proceedings. See Ewing v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. at 65
n.12 (Halpern and Holmes, JJ., dissenting).
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