Paul H. & Judy E. Rogers - Page 5

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               The first difficulty in this area of law is that different             
          states define “alimony” differently--in some states it means what           
          it does in Federal tax law, but in others it can mean something             
          quite different.  See, e.g., Hoover v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.             
          1995-183 (1995), (Ohio using “alimony” to mean both property                
          settlements and periodic support payments), affd. 102 F.3d 842              
          (6th Cir. 1996).  And the dichotomy between property settlements            
          and alimony that tax law draws--grows steadily murkier as                   
          different types of post-divorce payments proliferate.  Tennessee            
          divorce law, for example, used to classify all alimony as either            
          in solido (roughly equivalent to property settlements) or in                
          futuro (roughly equivalent to section 71 alimony).  Bryan v.                
          Leach, 85 S.W.3d 136, 145 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).  Then, in 1984,            
          the Tennessee legislature created “rehabilitative alimony,”                 
          explaining in the new statute:                                              
                    It is the intent of the general assembly                          
                    that a spouse who is economically                                 
                    disadvantaged, relative to the other spouse,                      
                    be rehabilitated whenever possible by the                         
                    granting of an order for payment of                               
                    rehabilitative, temporary support and                             
                    maintenance. * * *                                                
          Acts 1984, ch. 818, secs. 1-3, codified in Tenn. Code Ann. sec.             
          36-5-101(d)(1) (2001 & Supp. 2004); see also Cranford v.                    
          Cranford, 772 S.W.2d 48, 50-51 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989), revd. on              
          other grounds at Bogan v. Bogan, 60 S.W.3d 721 (Tenn. 2001);                
          Gotten v. Gotten, 748 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).                     






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