Paul H. & Judy E. Rogers - Page 8

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                    rehabilitation * * * [t]his will, if Mrs.                         
                    Self desires, allow support for her in an                         
                    amount sufficient to allow her to be self                         
                    supporting and obtain a Bachelor’s Degree in                      
                    a field of her choosing.  The Court feels                         
                    that * * * she should be rehabilitated to                         
                    such an extent that she can be gainfully                          
                    employed and after four years take her place                      
                    in the economic market place. * * *                               
          Id.  On these facts, Mrs. Self had a strong argument that the               
          payments--fixed in amount and term--were rehabilitative alimony:            
          The Court had made a specific finding that she was capable of               
          rehabilitation and fixed the payments to pay for rehabilitation.            
          Unlike the Rogers’ case, moreover, the trial court’s order in               
          Self expressly stated that the payments would cease upon Mrs.               
          Self’s death or remarriage.  Then, four years after the trial               
          court entered its order, Mrs. Self moved to keep the alimony                
          payments coming because, despite a good faith effort, she had yet           
          to be rehabilitated.  The trial court dismissed her petition,               
          holding that it lacked jurisdiction because rehabilitative                  
          alimony was a form of alimony in solido, and alimony in solido is           
          unmodifiable under Tennessee law.  See McKee v. McKee, 655 S.W.2d           
          164, 165 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).                                             
               The Tennessee Supreme Court agreed.  It reasoned that                  
                    [t]he critical factor in determining whether                      
                    an award for the support and maintenance of a                     
                    former spouse is subject to modification is                       
                    the initial finding by the trial court                            
                    regarding the relative economic conditions of                     
                    the parties and the feasibility of                                
                    rehabilitation of the disadvantaged spouse.                       






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