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1999-474.)
We begin, as do the parties, with the language of the order
pendente lite. For Rogers, this order’s language supports his
position that the Circuit Court recognized that his ex-wife was
in a position of relative financial disadvantage. She had spent
her entire adult life as a housewife reliant upon his income, and
at age 52 was ten years too young to collect Social Security. He
argues that the weekly payments could only have been justified
under Tennessee law if the Circuit Court judge found them to be
needed for support and maintenance of a financially struggling
spouse. 1 Tenn. Jur. Divorce & Alimony � 35 (2003). He then
asks us to infer that when this temporary obligation was
continued in the final decree it reflected an implicit finding by
the Circuit Court that his ex-wife would continue to be
economically disadvantaged. He implies that we should reason
from this that the Rogers intended the rehabilitative alimony in
this case be classified as alimony in futuro--the sort of alimony
that in 1992 Tennessee would stop at the death of the payee
spouse.
We disagree, and side with the Commissioner on this point.
The better conclusion from the evidence at hand is that the
alimony here wasn’t even intended to be rehabilitative. The
Commissioner emphasizes language added in the Dissolution
Agreement and Final Decree that refers to the weekly payments as
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