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It is unsurprising, then, that the parties in this case
fight their battle as one of classification--the Commissioner
argues that the disputed payments are alimony in solido, see
Towner v. Towner, 858 S.W.2d 888, 891 (Tenn. 1993), that the
obligation to pay alimony in solido does not end with the death
of the payee spouse under Tennessee law, and that the payments
are thus just part of the nondeductible property settlement
between the Rogers. Rogers insists that the payments are
rehabilitative alimony, and so would end at his former wife’s
death by the express command of Tennessee law that
“rehabilitative support and maintenance shall terminate upon the
death of the recipient.” Tenn. Code Ann. sec. 36-5-101(d)(2).
We disagree at the outset with Rogers on this point. The
section he cites became part of Tennessee law in 1993, after the
divorce proceedings between him and his former wife were
complete. 1993 Tenn. Pub. Acts 243. Under Tennessee law,
substantive changes in divorce law will not affect divorces that
occur before the enactment of the law. Waddey v. Waddey, 6
S.W.3d 230, 232 n.1. (Tenn. 1999); Bryan v. Leach, 85 S.W.3d 136,
143 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). So we must refine our analysis to try
to determine what a Tennessee court would do under the law in
effect in 1992.
Under the law as it stood before the 1993 amendment,
however, it was less than clear whether the legislature had made
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