-69-
taxpayers and their investment in real property in the United
States; petitioner invested in the U.S. real estate and
voluntarily filed Federal income tax returns reporting that
income net of the expenses related thereto.
For sake of completeness, we also note the legislative
reenactment doctrine. Under that doctrine, Congress is presumed
to have known of the administrative and judicial interpretations
of a statutory term reenacted without significant change and to
have ratified and included that interpretation in the reenacted
term. See Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S.
at 574-576; Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 567 (1988);
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S.
353, 381-382 (1982); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-581
(1978); see also Dresser Indus. v. United States, 238 F.3d 603,
614 (5th Cir. 2001); Kovacs v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 124,
129-130 (1993), affd. without published opinion 25 F.3d 1048
(6th Cir. 1994); cf. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,
696-697 (1979) (“It is always appropriate to assume that our
elected representatives, like other citizens, know the law”.).
See generally 2A Sands, Sutherland on Statutory Construction
� 49.09 (4th ed. 1973), and cases cited therein. The legislative
reenactment doctrine applies with vigor where Congress reenacts
statutory text mainly in its entirety, see Dutton v. Wolpoff
& Abramson, 5 F.3d 649, 655 (3d Cir. 1993), or where a prior
Page: Previous 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011