-61-
the referenced statutes but omitted the word “time” in favor of
only the word “manner” in other single sections of those
statutes; e.g., as in section 882(c)(2) and its predecessors.
See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 537-538 (1994);
Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 338 (1994); Keene
Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993); Russello v.
United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983). In construing a statute,
we must give a definite meaning to every word and expression
found therein, Dubuque & P.R. Co. v. Litchfield, 64 U.S. 66, 77
(1859); Early v. Doe, 57 U.S. 610, 617 (1853), and we must shy
away from interpreting a statute in a way that would render any
part of it redundant or surplusage, see Platt v. Union Pac. R.R.
Co., 99 U.S. 48, 58-59 (1878). See Jones v. United States, 529
U.S. 848, 857 (2000); United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528,
538-539 (1955); see also United States v. Olympic Radio &
Television, Inc., 349 U.S. 232, 235-236 (1955) (in applying the
traditional rules of statutory construction, a court should
assume that Congress uses language in a consistent manner, unless
otherwise indicated). Such is especially so where, as here, we
understand Congress’s use of the word “manner” in the referenced
Code sections as giving context to that word. We understand that
use to refer to items of information and not to refer to the time
for the filing of a return or the furnishing of any other
document. We conclude that Congress, by using only the word
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