-56-
9 The judiciary is the final authority on issues
of statutory construction and must reject
administrative constructions which are contrary to
clear congressional intent. * * * If a court,
employing traditional tools of statutory construction,
ascertains that Congress had an intention on the
precise question at issue, that intention is the law
and must be given effect.
[Id. at 842-843 (some fn. refs. omitted; citations
omitted).]
The question arises from the timing of these two decisions
whether the Supreme Court intended for Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., supra, to replace Natl. Muffler
Dealers Association v. United States, supra, in the review of a
Federal tax regulation. We have previously stated with respect
to that question: “we are inclined to the view that the impact of
the traditional, i.e., National Muffler standard, has not been
changed by Chevron, but has merely been restated in a practical
two-part test with possibly subtle distinctions as to the role of
legislative history and the degree of deference to be accorded to
a regulation.” Central Pa. Sav. Association & Subs. v.
Commissioner, 104 T.C. 384, 392 (1995); see also id. at 390-392
(discussing the review of Federal tax regulations under Natl.
Muffler in relation to Chevron); cf. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co.
v. Commissioner, 41 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 1994) (questioning whether
Chevron applies to interpretative Federal tax regulations).
Here, we conclude likewise that we need not parse the semantics
of the two tests to discern any substantive difference between
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