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“manner” in section 882(c)(2), did not intend to include in that
provision any element of time.17 Nor do we believe that Congress
intended for the word “manner” in that situation to have a
flexible definition to be prescribed by the Secretary in order to
carry out the text’s general purpose, as was the case in Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. at 844.
Instead, we believe that the word “manner”, when used in the
relevant text, was intended by Congress to have only the single
definition that we decide herein.
Respondent requests that we defer to the Secretary’s
interpretation of the word “manner” to include a timely filing
requirement. We decline to do so. Because we find the meaning
of the word “manner” as used in section 882(c)(2) to be plain and
unambiguous, any deference that we would otherwise accord to the
Secretary’s interpretation of the word “manner” is unwarranted.18
17 In fact, as to the 18-month period set forth in the
regulations, it is not only arbitrary but without any statutory
basis at all. As we understand the Secretary’s formation of that
period, it corresponds to 1 year after the 6-month extended due
date of the return. See T.D. 8322, 1990-2 C.B. 172, 172-173,
55 Fed. Reg. 50827 (Dec. 11, 1990); see also sec. 6081(a)
(generally allowing the Secretary to grant extensions of up to
6 months). Where that 1-year rule came from, we do not know.
18 A term is ambiguous if it is “‘capable of being
understood in two or more possible senses or ways’”. Chickasaw
Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001) (quoting
Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 77 (1985)). Although
the disputed regulations are contrary to our construction of the
text, as is the construction of the relevant text by respondent,
we do not believe that these contrary interpretations mean that
(continued...)
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