-70-
judicial interpretation of that text has been relied upon and
never questioned by the judiciary as of the time of reenactment,
see Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, supra at 696-697 (prior
interpretation of a statute “was repeatedly cited with approval
and never questioned during the ensuing five years”); see
also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, supra
at 378-379. In the light of the legislative reenactment
doctrine, we presume that Congress upon reenacting the relevant
text without significant change as part of the 1939, 1954, and
1986 Codes, as well as part of the Foreign Investors Tax Act of
1966, was mindful of the relevant judicial interpretations and
included within the reenacted text the judiciary’s interpretation
that the text contains no timely filing requirement.26 See
Dutton v. Wolpoff & Abramson, supra at 655; cf. Kovacs v.
Commissioner, supra at 129-130 (concluding by application of the
legislative reenactment doctrine that Congress had adopted a
prior Board decision when it amended section 104(a)(2) in 1982
and 1989, and when it enacted the Internal Revenue Codes of 1939,
1954, and 1986).
This presumption is further supported by considering the
setting of each of the reenactments of the relevant text
26 In fact, respondent concedes that Congress knows of
Anglo-Am. Direct Tea Trading Co. v. Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 711
(1938), and that it is significant that Congress has never
amended the relevant text after that case.
Page: Previous 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011