Interference 103,482
encompassing metallocenes defined by a structural formula of
Count 2, describes the specific subject matter of Count 2 in
the manner required by the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112.
Therefore, the APJ denied Ewen benefit of the filing date of
Application 07/220,007 (Paper No. 61, pp. 3-4, bridging
para.), citing Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d
1565, 1571-72, 41 USPQ2d 1961, 1966 (Fed. Cir. 1997):
Entitlement to a filing date does not extend to subject
matter which is not disclosed, but would be obvious over
what is expressly disclosed. It extends only to that
which is disclosed. While the meaning of the terms,
phrases, or diagrams in a disclosure is to be explained
or interpreted from the vantage point of one skilled
in the art, all the limitations must appear in the
specification. The question is not whether a claimed
invention is an obvious variant of that which is
disclosed in the specification. Rather, a prior
application itself must describe an invention, and do so
in sufficient detail
that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that
the inventor invented the claimed invention as of the
filing date sought.
FF. July 15, 1998 -- Dolle filed a §1.633(c)(2) Motion
To Redefine Interfering Subject Matter (Paper No. 64). Dolle
moved (1) to amend Claims 4, 16 and 19 (Appendix D) of
Application 08/147,006, purportedly to correct a typographical
error, and
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