Appeal No. 2001-0096 Application 09/301,891 Appellant’s briefs miss the point of an obviousness-type double patenting rejection, which is, from the patent term standpoint, as follows: The public should … be able to act on the assumption that upon the expiration of the patent it will be free to use not only the invention claimed in the patent but also the modifications or variants which would have been obvious to those of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made, taking into account the skill of the art and prior art other than the invention claimed in the issued patent (Emphasis in Original). In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 892-893, 225 USPQ 645, 648 (Fed. Cir. 1985), citing In re Zickendraht, 319 F.2d 225, 232, 138 USPQ 23, 27 (CCPA 1963) (Rich, J. concurring). We decline the Appellant’s inherent invitation to substitute an infringement-type standard or restriction requirement-type standard for this rationale. Claims may have different scope and yet remain not patentably distinct. The proper analysis is an obviousness analysis. Appellant’s additional argument that the issued patent and the pending application have the same priority claims and therefore will expire simultaneously is without merit. Patent terms may be adjusted for various reasons, e.g. pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 154 (b). Appellant also states (without citation to authority) that “It is improper to combine references when formulating an obviousness-type double patenting rejection.” (Main Brief, page 5, lines 22-23), and “Obviousness-type double patenting cannot combine references” (Reply Brief, page 5, line 3). 6Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 NextLast modified: November 3, 2007