Ex Parte Mui et al - Page 11

                Appeal 2007-1269                                                                              
                Application 10/636,468                                                                        
                usually must evaluate both the scope and content of the prior art and the                     
                level of ordinary skill solely on the cold words of the literature").                         
                      In sustaining a multiple reference rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a),                  
                the Board may rely on one reference alone without designating it as a new                     
                ground of rejection.  In re Bush, 296 F.2d 491, 496, 131 USPQ 263, 266-67                     
                (CCPA 1961); In re Boyer, 363 F.2d 455, 458 n.2, 150 USPQ 441, 444 n.2                        
                (CCPA 1966).                                                                                  
                      During examination of patent application, a claim is given its broadest                 
                reasonable construction consistent with the specification.  In re Prater, 415                 
                F.2d 1393, 1404-05, 162 USPQ 541, 550-51 (CCPA 1969).  "[T]he words of                        
                a claim 'are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.'"                          
                Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312, 75 USPQ2d 1321, 1326 (Fed.                        
                Cir. 2005) (en banc) (internal citations omitted).  The "ordinary and                         
                customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have                     
                to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention,            
                i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application."  Id. at 1313, 75            
                USPQ2d at 1326.                                                                               

                                                ANALYSIS                                                      
                      Appellants contend that Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-11 and                     
                14 as being obvious over Pasadyn and Liu.  Reviewing the findings of facts                    
                cited above, we do not agree that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-5,                 
                7-11, and 14.  In particular, we find that the Appellants have not shown that                 
                the Examiner failed to make a prima facie showing of obviousness with                         
                respect to claims 1-5, 7-11, and 14.  Appellants failed to meet the burden of                 
                overcoming that prima facie showing.  However, we agree with Appellants                       

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