- 29 -
occupied that house on December 15, 1989. Florence continued to
live in the Burlington house until mid-July of 1989, and any time
that petitioners spent in the Burlington house occurred between
mid-July and late August or early September of 1989. The record
as a whole convinces the Court that any occupancy of the
Burlington house by petitioners was at most just a few days on a
sporadic and intermittent basis. See supra note 20.
Petitioners testified in an attempt to rebut such evidence
and to try to establish their use of the Burlington house.
Petitioners presented no witnesses or documentary evidence to
corroborate their self-serving testimony. They alleged the
Mandarin house was purchased and used for business purposes. We
found their testimony to be vague, inconsistent, and generally
not credible. We are not required to accept such testimony.
Potito v. Commissioner, 534 F.2d 49, 51 (5th Cir. 1976), affg.
T.C. Memo. 1975-187; Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74, 77
(1986). See supra note 20.
Based on all the facts and circumstances, we find that the
Burlington house was not used by either petitioner as a principal
residence after October of 1987.24 Therefore, section 1034 does
not apply to the sale of the Burlington house, and petitioners
must recognize the gain from that sale in 1989.
24 Since we reach this conclusion, we need not address
respondent's argument that only Deborah's principal residence is
at issue because Mr. Bowers had no legal or equitable title to
the Burlington property while the Trust had record title.
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