- 35 -
expert in plastics to evaluate the Partnership transactions. The
facts of petitioners' cases are distinctly different from the
Rousseau case. Accordingly, we do not consider petitioners'
arguments with respect to the Krause and Rousseau cases
applicable.
2. Petitioners' Purported Reliance on Becker
Petitioners also maintain that they reasonably relied upon
the advice of a qualified adviser, Becker.19
a. The Circumstances Under Which a Taxpayer May Avoid
Liability Under Section 6653(a)(1) and (2) Because of
Reasonable Reliance on Competent and Fully Informed
Professional Advice
A taxpayer may avoid liability for the additions to tax
under section 6653(a)(1) and (2) if he or she reasonably relied
on competent professional advice. United States v. Boyle, 469
U.S. 241, 250-251 (1985); Freytag v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 849,
888 (1987), affd. 904 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1990), affd. 501 U.S.
868 (1991). Reliance on professional advice, standing alone, is
19 We note that Farrell extensively argues this point in his
posttrial brief. In general, some of Farrell's factual positions
conflict with the record of his case, and the principal cases
that he cites are inapplicable and distinguishable for the
following general, nonexclusive reasons: (1) They involve far
less sophisticated taxpayers; (2) the reasonableness of the
respective taxpayers' reliance on expert advice was established
in those cases on grounds that do not exist here; and (3) the
advice given was within the adviser's area of expertise.
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