- 17 -
Federal Rules of Evidence, the trial judge must ensure that any
and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only
relevant, but is also reliable). Petitioners further argue that
neither Dr. Bajaj's underlying data nor his empirical analysis
has been published or otherwise submitted for peer review by the
appraisal profession. Finally, petitioners argue that, in part,
the data Dr. Bajaj relied upon was not available in 1992, and,
therefore, a willing and knowledgeable buyer and seller could
not, at that time, be expected to have relied on Dr. Bajaj's
marketability discount analysis in arriving at a fair market
value determination of G&J's stock. Petitioners cite Estate of
Newhouse v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 193 (1990), and Estate of
Mueller v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-284, as authority for
the proposition that we must reject Dr. Bajaj's new data and
empirical analysis as a matter of law. We disagree.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., supra at 585-587, the
Supreme Court held that the "general acceptance" test, the
dominant standard for determining the admissibility of novel
scientific evidence at trial, was superseded by the adoption of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Fed. R. of Evid. 702 reads:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
Page: Previous 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011