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life or other unspecified insurance.9 We thus conclude that
insurance payments of $6,724 in 1990 and $7,471 in 1991 for
coverage of the marital home10 were made “under” the written
separation agreement embodied in the June 1 letters; the
remaining insurance payments were not.
Were the Payments to Third Parties Received “on Behalf of”
Hermine?
Rule 91(a) contemplates stipulations of matters “[involving]
fact or opinion or the application of law to fact.” Rule 91(e)
provides generally that a stipulation shall be treated as a
conclusive admission by the party to it which the party is not
permitted to qualify, change or contradict. Hermine has
stipulated that the payments to third parties at issue in this
case were “on Hermine’s behalf”; she is therefore generally
precluded from qualifying or contradicting that stipulation. See
id. However, where the Court finds that a stipulation is plainly
contrary to the facts revealed by the record, the Court is
justified in disregarding the stipulation. See Jasionowski v.
9 We note in this regard the likelihood, in the context of
the record, that some of the generically described insurance
payments were for insurance covering the automobile Harvey was
providing for Hermine.
10 While a portion of the homeowner policy premiums for the
marital home represented extra coverage for “jewelry and furs”,
we conclude that insurance for such high value contents fairly
falls within the terms of “normal and usual expenses of
maintenance and operation” of a residence.
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